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ABNORMAL OPERATION
In
the foregoing we mainly discussed the system operating normally. In
the following sections, we begin to discuss how the system handles
abnormal situations. It is anticipated
that these should be exceedingly rare; but rare or not, a prudent system
architect must anticipate failure and insure that when, or if, it fails, it
fails in a safe mode.
A. Communication Failure
The system can not be allowed
to operate if the communication system fails.
To borrow an expression from a popular movie, “Failure is not an
option”. The system must be provided
with redundant radio communication facilities separated by geography. If a landline fails, a router immediately
re-routs the communication around the affected line.
Not
withstanding, we must begin to think the unthinkable. If an entrance station looses communication, that station
immediately embargoes further launching on the system. If for any reason, the failure is not just
an isolated failure at a single station, the entire line or the entire system
is embargoed from further launching.
Positive
radio communication is maintained, through the several sector monitors, with
every carrier on the system. Periodic
check messages are transmitted frequently to insure this. It is one more advantage of a distributed
control system that if communication with a central authority is severed, the
carrier is not rendered uncontrolled.
A
failure in this requires that the system be shut down. Both launch functions and transfer functions
will be cancelled, thus precluding any potential conflict. Carriers will continue on their present
line regardless of their original intention. .
It
is imperative that this shut down is not done precipitously. Each packet leader will slowly reduce the
speed of his packet in a prescribed protocol.
This to insure that following packets, that for one reason or another
are not responding have ample time to react to the slow down.
Each
packet will leave the system at the next appropriate exit. The vehicles will exit, and the empty
carriers will be routed back to the guideway.
B.
Overflow
As
was indicated, each exit station, whether destination or transfer, must provide
a buffer to absorb peak loads. This is
essentially a section of track, perhaps several hundred feet long. This allows an exiting carrier to leave the
main line with no disruption to the remaining packet. We re-emphasize that this capability is essential to the
operation of a well-ordered system.
Occasionally
this buffer may overflow i.e., for the moment, the buffer can not handle an
additional carrier. In that instance,
the buffer overflow monitor will notify the system monitor. The system monitor will, in turn, cause the
station-to-carrier net to broadcast a general alert to all carriers upstream of
the overflow. Each affected carrier is
provided an alternate and it exits there normally.
C. System Blockage
One
disadvantage of a rail-based system is that it is particularly vulnerable to
blockage; one can't simply drive around.
Accordingly, this places a special emphasis on the maintenance of track
and rolling stock. Continuous
self-checking, and a frequent and thorough maintenance regimen are essential to
insure carrier reliability. Fortunately
the system controls its own destiny; after it is loaded onto a carrier, the
vehicle plays no further part in the operation. The system is in no way dependent on the electrical or mechanical
condition of the transported vehicle.
Moreover, as a restricted access system there are no grade crossings or
other opportunities to collide with non-system objects. Thus blockages should be rare.
Nevertheless,
a prudent system designer must provide for this possibility, no matter how
remote. The system must halt all
upstream traffic. All packets would
then be instructed to exit the line at the next station, thus clearing the line
(at least to the obstruction.) It might
be necessary for a packet to backup in order to reach an exit. One would want to be very sure that the line was clear before ordering this.
All
vehicles would exit. Those commuters
whose destination were beyond could make their way on the surface to an
unobstructed entrance station, wait, or seek alternate means. Restricted service to unaffected
destinations could then be restored in accord with an emergency scenario
developed for this precise situation.
It
is probable under these circumstances that the next exit station would have
insufficient docking space to accommodate all carriers expeditiously. This
would require the exiting process to proceed quite slowly. Each carrier, in turn, would dock, discharge
its load, and return to the system.
D. Power Failure
Every
effort must be made to maintain the integrity of the power distribution
system. It is anticipated that
electrical power would be supplied along the system in a standard 60 Hertz
distribution line. If direct current is
chosen as the final distribution mode, we anticipate numerous trackside
rectifiers. In this manner, the
decision to use public utility power or a dedicated plant is simply one of
advantageous choice. Numerous ties to
the regular grid would facilitate service restoration.
In
any event all upstream traffic must be halted and a decision made whether to
clear the system, or await restoration of power. To accommodate the former, each carrier would have a battery
backup with enough energy to sustain the electronics and to drive the carrier
slowly to the next exit. Exit would be
effected as described above.